THE 1948 VANPORT FLOOD

An Environmental Justice & Socio-Ecological Perspective

Portland, Oregon

SARA GOLDSTEIN, 2022

Photo: “Flooded Apartments During the Vanport Flood” via Oregon Historical Society: ref. OrgLot131_041

Disclaimer: In this paper I use the terms “African American” and “Black” interchangeably, although I do acknowledge these are discrete identities. The terms “Negro" or "Negroe” is only used in context with quoted language or organization names from the 1900s.

Introduction

 

On May 30th, 1948 at 4:17 pm, a wall of water burst over the Vanport housing projects and submerged the town under 15 feet of water, displacing 18,500 residents (Rivera, 2007; Oregon live via Queen, 2021). Nearly one-third of the displaced were African American (McGregor, 2003). The social, ecological, and spatial conditions surrounding the flood illustrate how uneven impacts of the disaster were created, and how they continue to affect resilience for the Black community generations later. By examining the Vanport flood from a socio-ecological perspective we can see how together, social and environmental factors affect a community’s capacity to cope, adapt, and transform to crisis (Keck et al., 2013). Applying an environmental justice lens, further uncovers how resilience capacity varies across space, time, and demographics (Pastor et al., 2006). Drawing from panarchy adaptive cycle theory, these observations can instruct planners and communities how to be better prepared for the future (Walker, 2004). 

Background

 

In 1941, Kaiser opened a shipyard in Portland to support WWII, but faced difficulty finding local labor. Kaiser began to recruit from outside of Oregon and despite pushback, opened their workforce to African Americans, “If it is necessary to bring in large numbers of Negro workers, locate them on the edge of the city” said President of Central East Portland Community Club (Rivera 2007; McGregor, 2003). Vanport was one of several Federal housing projects built to accommodate migrant labor, but only Vanport and Guild Lake permitted Black residents. During this time, 20,000 - 25,000 Black people migrated to Portland and approximately half remained after the war (Pearson, 1993). Vanport bordered Smith Lake and the Columbia River, with the 4th largest annual streamflow volume in the US (Queen, 2021). Before the 1961 Columbia River Treaty, the river had only 6% storage capacity and a high risk for flooding. Three years after WWII, 18,500 people still lived in Vanport and despite numerous concerns about the water level, residents were told the dike was secure. 12 hours later it broke, destroying the entire town and killing 15 people, although the death toll is commonly contested (Stone, 2017). 

Photo and caption via McElderry, 1998 via Oregon Historical Society

Socio-Ecological Conditions

Vanport was built on a low-lying, muddy marsh, ridden with insects and rodents, with a single exit to the East for Denver Avenue (Rivera, 2007). The buildings were:

“never more than a huge collection of “cracker box houses strung together fast and cheap” (Pearson, 1993).

Oregon did not welcome the rising Black population and had a culture of animosity and hatred towards Black people. Until 1926, Oregon’s constitution included Black exclusion laws that:

outlawed any, “negro, or mulatto” from entering the state, holding real estate, or making contracts and gave public officials the power to forcibly remove them” (Hamberg, 2017, p.9).

Despite being majority white laborers, Vanport was nicknamed "the Negro project", and was often touted as a planning success because it separated laborers from the general public (McGregor, 2003). Strict curfews, rules, and regulations were enforced on residents, like “a military base” (Skovgaard, 2007).

Within Vanport, families of color faced deeply rooted interpersonal and institutional racism.

White Vanport residents circulated false rumors that Black men were attacking white women and that they were stockpiling weapons to prepare for an assault (McElderry, 1998).

Housing was segregated and Black families were given less desirable units. The Vanport Tenants League, an African American organization pushed for fair treatment in the projects and the Urban League and Portland Planning and Housing Association persuaded the Housing Authority of Portland’s (HAP) to adopt a non-discriminatory policy– but Vanport remained effectively segregated thanks to HAP’s disregard (McElderry, 1998). When asked, the HAP claimed remaining segregation was due to “free choice” (Rivera, 2007).

 

Photo courtesy: Pearson 1993

 

During the winter before the flood, deep snowpack, heavy rains, rising temperatures, and increased snow melt resulted in the Columbia River peaking 31 feet above normal (McElderry, 1998; Queen, 2021). A single dike protected Vanport from the lake and the river, and when it broke, buildings were destroyed immediately and oil from the refinery nearby spilled over the wreckage (Cosens, 2012). The scale of disaster was tremendous, and skepticism around the actual death toll reflected the distrust the community had for HAP. Local residents told stories of the river current sweeping bodies downstream and grave diggers working overtime (Pearson, 1993).

“They claimed that only a few people died. I didn’t believe that. Because so many people worked graveyard and swing shift. Some people couldn’t even get out. They pretend it was only thirteen people. But I never believe that” (Rosa Lee via Rivera, 2007).

Racist Environmental Planning

 

Most refugees were taken in by Portland families. HAP relocated a small group into trailers on Swan island but refused to provide any long term public housing options (Hamberg, 2017). With no resources or belongings, all refugees struggled to secure housing, but Black families faced additional challenges of racial covenants, racist realtors, and redlining in:

“the worst place on the Pacific coast to be black and unemployed” (Tuttle, 1999).

Racial covenants were legal clauses written directly in home deeds claiming homes:

“shall not be used or occupied by Chinese, Japanese, or Negroes except that persons of such races may be employed as servants”

and it was common knowledge that 90% or more of real estate brokers in Portland would not sell a home to an African American in a white neighborhood (Rivera, 2007). The Home Owners Loan Corporation drew up racist security maps that are now known today as redlining, which devalued areas and denied loans if even one Black family lived there (Thompson, 2018). There were only two census tracts (present-day Lower Albina) that allowed Black people to buy homes, and the surrounding areas in response, experienced white flight which resulted in divestment, degradation, and dilapidation of the neighborhood (Pearson, 1996). “During the 1950s, Albina lost one third of its population and experienced significant racial turnover. … By decade’s end, there were 23,000 fewer White and 7,300 more Black residents” (Gibson, 2007).

 

Vanport residents were in disadvantageous positions to cope with the flood, particularly due to the gaslighting and deprioritization by local and federal government agencies HAP and the Federal Army Corp of Engineers. The morning of the flood, HAP distributed flyers saying:

“DIKES ARE SAFE AT PRESENT YOU WILL BE WARNED IF NECESSARY YOU WILL HAVE TIME TO LEAVE DON'T GET EXCITED” (Skovgaard, 2007).

That morning, HAP removed valuable documents and items from their official buildings in Vanport and after the dike broke, they didn’t sound alarms, and instead tried to fix it (Hamberg, 2017). Later, a HAP representative, admitted that “the only place they were at all worried about then was at the Portland Yacht Club” and one other building (Hamberg, 2017). Additionally, City planning was desperately inadequate, estimating that only 9000 people could be housed by HAP and the Red Cross in an emergency event, less than 50% of Vanport’s population (Rivera, 2007). The community coped with these conditions through civilian action. About 30 students of Vanport College who were in the area alerted the community to evacuate before the warning sirens went off (Pearson), people formed human chains to pull people from the water, and doctors like Dr. Unthank volunteered their time to treat the injured.

“Rescuing residents trapped in Vanport Flood” courtesy of Oregon Historical Society

Map: 1940 Portland Redlining Map via Mapping Inequality

Resilience Evaluation

 

HAP had the most power for change, but despite anti-discrimination laws, the culture of racism was so pervasive they only saw Vanport as a mere nuisance, and even tried to call for its destruction in response to racist concerns. Many suspected that HAP allowed the dike to destroy Vanport, representing the immense tension at the time. One local leader summarized Portlanders attitudes:

“Portlanders anxiously awaited the end of the war…so that these people [the migrants] can get the hell out of Portland” (Taylor, The Great Migration Podcast via Hamberg, 2017).

Coping, adapting, and transforming after the Vanport flood was particularly difficult for the Black residents because of the intense conditions of racism, but the crises at hand sparked transformative change in the community. Immediately after the flood, 5000 Black refugees were housed by White Portlanders, representing many white Portlander’s first meaningful contact with any Black people and an Oregonian headline read:

“Flood Need Proves Races Can Mingle: Barriers between Negroes, Whites Break Along with Dikes on River” (Hamberg, 2017).

Many displaced Vanport residents and allies rallied for change with a multiracial protests at the Rose Festival condemning the City’s response to the flood (Stone, 2017). The Negro Citizen and Taxpayer League pushed against discrimination from realtors (Hamberg, 2017), and Black centered banks, realtors, newspapers, and religious centers advocated for desegregation and fair treatment, and assisted members of the community in accessing resources. The Albina Neighborhood Improvement Program (ANIP) represented one of many community efforts to revitalize the neighborhood (Gibson, 2007). Despite revitalization efforts, deep rooted white supremacy, urban renewal (development of the Lloyd Center area and construction of I-84 and I-5), and the 1980’s crack epidemic set the stage for present-day rapid gentrification of this Lower Albina neighborhood, which has disproportionately impacted low-income and Black families. This vicious cycle of displacement for Portland’s Black community represents how the intersection of social, ecological, and spatial issues continue to reduce the adaptive capacity of these communities.

Recommendations

 

By examining the Vanport flood from socio-ecological and environmental justice perspectives, we can see how systemic racism created conditions that diminished the resilience capacity of Black residents. In addition to structural strategies for flood management like green and grey infrastructure, city planners, grassroots organizations, and communities must also develop non-structural flood management strategies like response plans, recovery plans, improved rating systems, floodplain ordinances and managed retreat (Flood Factor, 2021; Berke, 2006). The Columbia River Treaty recently had an eleventh round of negotiations and it is critical that these non-structural measures are added to the agreement that is primarily focused on hydropower and river infrastructure (Cosens, 2012; US Department of State, 2021). Additionally, urban planners and resilience work needs to treat existing patterns of displacement with the historic and socio-ecological contexts they deserve.

References